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In this paper, a set of variables expected to determine piracy trends for the upcoming years is considered. 
Using the OLS estimators’ approach, the extent to which market saturation for streaming services on 
demand (SVoD) rebounds in the thriving market for piracy websites is evaluated. After a careful analysis, 
the study reveals an adequate level of acceptability, that indeed, one can expect revenue’s surplus from 
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Is streaming competitive landscape pushing consumers back to piracy? 
Developments from a statistical study on the Chinese market. 
In years past, video on demand was an outlandish concept, let alone subscription video on 
demand. Although not many of us acknowledged the advancement of this industry, it is inevitable 
in the developed world to ignore its far-reaching presence. Nonetheless, at the time, not only 
consumers but also suppliers neglected the potential of video piracy, unaware of its status as the 
major player in this upcoming thriving market. 
According to The Motion Picture Associationa, 
China is rated as the country with the highest 
piracy rate (Graph1). Notwithstanding, with the 
broadband internet boom around 2008, suitable 
streaming services began to offer easy access to 
video content, which made it preferable for 
consumers to turn from peer to peer file sharing to legal platforms for a minor monthly fee. 
In a short period of time, what seemed to be a 
blue ocean had turned red, as the streaming war 
intensified. The real question is: To what extent 
is the SVoD market saturated? According to 
PCMag b current studies (Graph2), 75% of 
respondents were not interested in subscribing 
to any of the newly announced streaming services such as Disney +, or Apple TV +.  
                                                 
a L.E.K. (2019). (online) Available at: https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/MPAstudy.pdf (Accessed 13 Dec. 2019). 
b Rob Marvin. (2019). 75 % of Subscribers Don't Plan on Adding New Services. PCMAG. (online) Available at: https://www.pcmag.com (Accessed 13 Dec. 2019). 
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In fact, subscribing to China’s top 5 paid 
streaming websites would amount to a total of 
67 yuan (Graph3), the equivalent to a monthly 
fee for cable TV in China. All things considered, 
a question arises – is streaming competitive 
landscape pushing consumers back to piracy?  
To provide a sustainable answer, a statistical analysis of both legal and illegal video streaming 
markets was carried out, starting off by describing the model’s variables, following with a 
methodological analysis and wrapping up with results interpretation. 
Variables 
Revenue loss due to piracy c: Monetary revenue loss (in billions RMB) from legitimate online 
content providers to online piracy, including revenues lost to series’ episodes and movies (excludes 
both sectors of Pay TV and Sports). It illustrates community’s aptitude to consume streaming 
services (treated as a normal good). Herewith, this data also reflects the overall community mindset 
when choosing between a paid subscription or free access to online videos. 
Streaming penetration rate d: Assesses the level of streaming being consumed compared to its 
potential estimated market of consumption. Determines the dimension of the SVoD market and the 
predisposition of the Chinese community to pay for the subscription of this service.  
The succeeding pair of variables (Video streaming revenues and number of SVoD providers), was 
used as one. In other words, these were used to create a new variable - revenue per SVoD provider. 
This allows for a broader understanding of market prosperity and providers’ maturation. 
                                                 
c
 Data Source: Digital TV Research. Murray, S. (2017). The Cost of Movie Piracy. Wired.com. (online) Digitaltvresearch.com. Available at: 
https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/ugc/press/219.pdf (Accessed 11 Dec. 2019). 
d Data Source: CNNI (China Internet Network Information Centre). Cnnic.com.cn. (2019). 43rd Statistical Report on Internet Development in China. China 
Internet Network Information Center. (online) Available at: https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/ (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019). 
 
 









Video streaming revenues e:  Annual revenue of the online video market (in billion RMB). 
According to the considered data, revenue is predicted to grow 2.3% (CAGR 2019-2023) per 
annum. Numbers display SVoD’s thriving settlement rate in the Chinese market.  
Number of SVoD providers f: Illustrates China’s SVoD market supply magnitude – the number of 
current established Chinese SVoD companies. The assembled data was taken from 2019’s outright 
list of providers, which make up for 17 active providers as of this year. As there are no expectations 
of compelling changes in the short-term, the number of suppliers is kept constant from 2019 
onwards. 
Regulation on piracy websites g: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if, on a given year, the 
government acted upon copyright infringement mitigation, and 0 if not (Graph4). In 2010, several 
amendments were put on the table to improve the “Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of 
China”. In 2014, the previous was reformulated. In 2017, 2018 and 2019 The National Copyright 




After creating a regression using the OLS estimators’ approach, the following equation was given 
as the adequate illustration of the above variables’ correlation: 
 
 
                                                 
e Data Source: iResearch China and Statista. Iresearchchina.com. (2019). Revenue of China's Online Video Market Totaled 96.27 Bn Yuan in 2018. IResearch 
Global. (online) Available at: http://www.iresearchchina.com/content/details7_52897.html (Accessed 12 Dec. 2019).  Statista. (2019). China: online video 
market revenue from 2009 to 2022. Statista. (online) Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/278574/revenue-of-chinese-online-video-industry/ 
(Accessed 12 Dec. 2019). 
f Data Source: Flixed. Alex Munkachy. (2019). The Complete List of Streaming Services in China - 20+ Services. Flixed. (online) Available at: 
https://flixed.io/streaming-services-china/ (Accessed 13 Dec. 2019). 
g Data Source:NCAC (National Copyright Administration of China). En.ncac.gov.cn. (2019). NCAC. (online) Available at: http://en.ncac.gov.cn/ (Accessed 12 
Dec. 2019). 
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Firstly, it is paramount to assess the goodness of fit of the above regression in order to evaluate to 
which extent it is appropriate to use it as a correlation indicator. The regression adjusted R-squared 
is 95%, indicating that 95% of the variation of revenue loss due to piracy can be explained by its 
three independent variables. As for the remaining 5%, these account for missing variables on the 
model. However, given that the standard error of this regression in 3, one can state that, on average, 
data points fall shortly out of the regression and data considered is enough to explain the model. 
It must not be forgotten that these values might be the repercussion of regression noise, meaning 
that, despite depicting statistical interrelationship, these can still be irrelevant for the study in 
question. The regression significance F is approximately zero, in the sense that independent 
variables are, to a good extent, the creators of y outputs. Furthermore, by looking at individual p-
values, one can infer that independently of others, each individual variable is relevant to the study, 
as all fall within a 94% confidence interval. 
Looking at the regression, it is possible to assess the direction in which each variable influences 
revenue loss. Firstly, regarding streaming penetration rate and revenues per provider. As these 
increase, revenue loss due to piracy increases. This can be interpreted as a consequence of 
consumer outspread and increased market potential. Favourable conditions, as the aforementioned, 
make SVoD an eye-catching market, prone to the threats of new entrant and deeper supply 
fragmentation. As for regulation on piracy websites, better estimates for this indicator failed to be 
found due to China’s strong data protection. In fact, according to the provided statistical results, 
when of an intervention for copyright infringements, revenue losses increase, a counterproductive 
relationship. However, this variable lacks adequate assumptions and association with the actual 
mitigation of piracy. Thus, one can conclude that this coefficient fails to describe the direction in 














Based on this study one can conclude that there is strong evidence that, as the market for online 
video streaming saturates and consequently becomes fragmented, consumers are likely to turn to 
piracy websites, resulting in increasing revenue losses for SVoD providers. Even though the above 
study cannot be generalized for the whole population as it is based solemnly on 13 observations, all 
competing in the Chinese Market, it can be easily conceived that this trend has been felt worldwide. 
According to an experimental study carried out by Broadband Genie h, after questioning the 
respondents about the reasons to move away from streaming, costs were unexpectedly an 
uncommon answer. On the other hand, people demonstrated their frustration when facing the need 
to use several interfaces to access specific content. The most alarming is the fact that 60% of the 
1500 respondents said that they would consider acquiring a VPN to illegally access websites 
without revealing their identity. All things considered, this competitive landscape is prominently 
setting up a war that calls for action and above all creativity from SVoD’s providers, in order to 
compete with a free and almost unlimited, though illegal, streaming service. 
 
Annexes  
1. Variable’s data inputs                                     2. Regression Summary 
 
 
                                                 
h Briel, R. (2020). Survey: New streaming services could turn viewers toward piracy | Broadband TV News. (online) Available at: 
https://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2019/09/30/survey-new-streaming-services-could-turn-viewers-toward-piracy/ (Accessed 13 Dec. 2019). 








2010 6,70¥                         0,48 1 0,04¥                         
2011 10,03¥                       0,49 0 0,04¥                         
2012 13,37¥                       0,51 0 0,09¥                         
2013 16,70¥                       0,53 0 0,12¥                         
2014 20,03¥                       0,51 1 0,16¥                         
2015 23,37¥                       0,55 0 0,26¥                         
2016 26,70¥                       0,56 0 0,34¥                         
2017 31,80¥                       0,56 1 0,54¥                         
2018 37,40¥                       0,55 1 0,61¥                         
2019 40,95¥                       0,58 1 0,87¥                         
2020 44,50¥                       0,59 0 1,06¥                         
2021 48,05¥                       0,59 0 1,32¥                         









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 2610,54 870,18 85,01 0,00
Residual 9 92,13 10,24
Total 12 2702,67
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept -148,57 20,13 -7,38 0,00 -194,11 -103,03 -194,11 -103,03
Streaming Penetration Rate 317,12 38,47 8,24 0,00 230,09 404,16 230,09 404,16
Regulation on piracy websites 3,97 1,87 2,13 0,06 -0,25 8,19 -0,25 8,19
Streaming Revenues per SvOD Provider 4,02 1,88 2,14 0,06 -0,23 8,27 -0,23 8,27
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The purpose of this Equity Research is to perform a valuation of iQiyi, Inc. As a first step, 
an intensive analysis was performed, to provide a better understanding of the company’s 
framework. Secondly, DCF valuation was carried out, considering industry trends, as well as 
the available information that might influence its future performance. Following this, the 
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flows were reformulated. The 
research was made both on iQiyi’s Reports, on a wide variety of recent studies and news 
regarding iQiyi’s performance and investment decisions. As a conclusion, an investment 
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▪ Chinese technological companies have been investing 
heavily to reach supremacy in the online video market - iQiyi main 
competitors are currently backed up by Tecent and Alibaba, two of 
the World’s most valuable companies; 
▪ iQiyi’s own deep-pocketed parent company, Baidu, is 
struggling to have the same success of its rivals with stocks having 
lost more than 50% of its value since peaking on May 2018. 
▪ A steep price increase of stocks turns iQiyi’s lacklustre 
performance around. Revenue growth is expected for the 
foreseeable future. 
▪ Challenging macroeconomics conditions and trade 
tensions between China and USA make iQiyi’s stocks extremely 
volatile. 
▪ Investment in technology could be the edge needed for 
iQiyi to survive, namely 5G, Big Data and AI. 
▪ Piracy, which had been overlooked for the past few years, 




iQiyi is a Chinese company that offers online entertainment 
services to more than 100M subscribers worldwide. Backed by the 
internet conglomerate, Baidu, Inc., it is often called the Netflix of 
China, although it has yet to deliver a single quarter of profit. 
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Trouble ahead for iQiyi, Inc.? 
Get ready for a bumpy ride with this Chinese tech stock 
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(Values in ¥ billions) 2019 2020E 2021F 
Revenues 88.8 184.3 309.0 
COGS (27.8) (50.3) (75.7) 
EBITDA 40.9 103.4 188.6 
Net Profit 37.6 96.1 177.5 
Total Assets 120.4 234.3 388.1 
Total Liabilities 50.1 88.8 135.6 
NWC 40.7 90.6 158.9 
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Path and Milestones 
iQiyi, Inc. is a Chinese company based in Beijing that provides online 
entertainment services. Founded on April 22, 2010 by Baidu (China’s largest 
online search engine) as Qiyi, it changed its name to its current version in 
November 2011, one year before Baidu bought out the remaining entry investors 
to become the owner of 100% of the company.  
Initially, the company followed a business model, where revenues came 
exclusively from advertising. However, in 2014, and considering the success of 
the American streaming company Netflix (which followed a subscription based 
model, where subscribers payed a monthly fee to gain access to its content 
library), the company adjusted its strategy to start offering original content and 
third-party produced licensed content (besides the user created content already 
available) that would only be accessible to subscription-paying users.  
A few months later, the company received a second round of equity investment 
by Xiaomi and Shunwei Capital who invested $300 Million for 10 to 15 percent of 
the company, with Baidu remaining the majority owner, owning around 80% of 
the company. In the next years, the Company ramped up the investment in its 
content library, producing numerous original shows as well as establishing 
licensing deals with different companies (such as the aforementioned, Netflix).  
At the end of 2017, the company reported 50.8 million paying subscribers and a 
market share close to 28% of the Chinese online video streaming market. In 
March 2018, the company announced it would start selling its shares to the 
public, pricing its U.S. IPO at $18 per share, with the shares being listed on the 
Nasdaq with the symbol “IQ”. In November of the same year, considering the 
difficulty it was having to deal with considerably high content costs, the Company 
announced it would issue public debt, particularly $650 million in convertible 
senior notes. The proceeds would then be used to invest in content and 
technology, as well as capped call transactions to reduce potential dilution to 
shareholders upon conversion of the notes. Less than a year later, the company 
would return to the public debt markets, through the issuance of a $1.5 billion in 














intellectual property ecosystem and to accelerate IP-related business, such as 
subscription to its services, according to the South China Morning Post 1.  
As of today, the Company has four main sources of revenues, namely 
Membership services, Advertising services, Content distribution and a fourth 
source named Others, that is mainly related with the distribution of online video 
games. With various hit shows under its belt, iQiyi is currently the leading online 
video streamer in China, distinguishing itself from its competition by using its 
platform powered by AI, big data analytics and other core proprietary 
technologies to produce content that caters to user tastes, delivering superior 
entertainment to its users, improving operational efficiency and increasing return 




The Streaming Market in China is set to become an oligopoly. Indeed, there are 
two massive players, iQiyi Inc. and Tencent Video, both being backed up by one 
of China’s tech-giants (also known as BAT), namely Baidu Group and Alibaba 
Group. iQiyi covers 33% of the market, whereas Tencent Video ranges up to 
23%. The two together with Youku, the third player, cover almost all market 
demand. This meaning that a stable market competition took place between the 
three companies in a two plus one status.  
iQiyi has been pushing the boundaries of online video high-tech technologies not 
only in the national market, but also worldwide. In fact, from 2014 to 2018, three 
of the world’s top five SVoD providers were Chinese, whereas before, only one 
had achieved such accomplishment. One must commend iQiyi’s ability to win 
over such an intense and saturated market. It is, today, undoubtedly recognized, 
as the number one in this industry with a market cap of 15 billion USD, total 
revenues of 3,6 million USD and a startling record number of more than 100 
million subscribers, which, in total, spend on average 9,4 billion hours 2 per 
month watching the company’s video content. 
 
 
                                                 
1 South China Morning Post. (2020). Video streaming giant iQiyi raises US$1.5b in convertible notes issue. [online] Available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2072725/video-streaming-giant-iqiyi-raises-us15b-convertible-notes-issue [Accessed 4 Jan. 2020]. 
2 Ir.iqiyi.com. (2020). [online] Available at: https://ir.iqiyi.com/static-files/83481f9b-238f-4841-9591-c0f9c817c7dc [Accessed 4 Jan. 2020]. 
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To better understand the company’s current position, it is important to get to grips 











Firstly, when it comes to iQiyi’s strengths, it is important to start off with its high 
bargaining power when it comes to suppliers. Indeed, it relies on two main inputs, 
namely, bandwidth and content. In a market with such an intensive competition, 
finding substitutes at low prices has become an easy task. For example, China 
Unicom, China Telecom and China Mobile severely dispute in the 
telecommunications market, all three offering bandwidth at competitive prices. 
Secondly, the company has assured its high presence in social networking sites.  
Such efficient management has built a positive e-WOM effect (electronic word-of-
mouth), leveraging brand recognition and, thereupon, consumer loyalty. Lastly, 
iQiyi’s increasing and already highly skilled labour force, has reassured the 
capability of disrupting the market with efficient and innovative products and 
services. 
As for its weaknesses, these are mainly comprised by the company’s liquidity, as 
iQiyi continues on delivering net losses. Moreover, the high amount of property 
that is rented by iQiyi has made it susceptible to interest rates’ volatility and 
uncertainty in loan repayments. Finally, iQiyi faces high employee turnover rates 

















Regarding opportunities, these come down primarily to the foreseen increase of 
market potential for SVoD providers. Firstly, internet users have been increasing 
around 3% a year (Graph4), a trend that is expected to continue. Also, household 
consumption, which determines the size of the SVoD market and the 
predisposition of the Chinese community to pay for the subscription of this 
service, has been increasing around 5% per annum (Graph 5). Lastly, so as to 
keep a stable monetary policy, the Chinese Bank has been maintaining interest 
rates low. In fact, the People’s bank of China kept the interest rate for October 
exactly the same as in September - 4,2% for the one-year rate 3. This provides 
the company with new investment opportunities, at lower than expected costs. 
 
Lastly, iQiyi, Inc. faces several threats both in the short-term and long-term, thus, 
a priority analysis is paramount to effectively mitigate such implications and 
bypass any possible damages. As a matter of fact, the streaming market in China 
became rapidly saturated in recent years, as the number of significant suppliers 
quickly jumped from 12 in 2012 to 17 in 2018. This growing competition has 
forced companies to set lower prices and incur in higher costs so as to maintain a 
competitive advantage, a strategy also adopted by iQiyi, which charges a 
monthly fee at a fraction of production costs. This has been reflected on the 
company’s inability to generate profits, with its best result being a 1 billion dollar 
comprehensive loss as of the third quarter of 2019. Furthermore, the US-China 
trade war has had a negative effect on different facets of the Chinese market, 
mainly due to lower consumer confidence and price inflation. As bilateral trade 
between China and the US decreases, iQiyi is exposed to exchange rate 
fluctuations and currency risk, as well as to decreasing inventory since contracts 
with American companies, such as Netflix, can be broke. Another threat is 
comprised by the possible comeback on online video piracy as a major player 
(despite its legal status) in the SVoD market. Indeed, according to the study 
performed by the student Sara Costa (“Piracy comeback with the new decade”, 
2020), streaming companies will reach higher revenue losses due to piracy 
(Graph 6), as a consequence of market saturation and segmentation. Also, 
Chinese dynamic regulatory framework has brought stricter regulations, thus 
increasing companies’ efforts to comply with legal standards and raising the risk 
of potential lawsuits.  
 
                                                 
3 Cheng, E. (2020). Why China isn't cutting lending rates like the rest of the world. [online] CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/why-china-
isnt-cutting-lending-rates-like-the-rest-of-the-world.html [Accessed 5 Jan. 2020]. 
GRAPH 6. REVENUE LOSS DUE TO 
PIRACY 
 
Source: (“Piracy comeback with the new 
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GRAPH 4. INTERNET USERS IN CHINA 
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At iQiyi’s annual iJOY Conference in Shanghai, on October 15th, the company 
announced its marketing and content strategy for 2020. Regarding marketing, the 
company will continue to focus heavily on AI integration (Graph 7). Indeed, AI’s 
versatility, allows for a tailored advertising sequence that can reach users as they 
navigate throughout the platform. AI algorithms select the perfect timing and 
place to air advertisements, making its distribution more efficient and the pop-ups 
more user-friendly. With respect to Content, the company plans on investing 20 
billion yuan in over 200 new releases, ranging from six genres of TV series, 5 
genres of movies and a sizeable and increasing bet on the sports segment. As a 
matter of fact, iQiyi believes that the forthcoming years will be high on sports 
trends. For that matter, it has secured online broadcasting rights for the 2020 
Euro Cup and the top 12 Asian prequalification games for 2022 FIFA World Cup. 
Furthermore, at the iQIYI Knowledge Ceremony, held in Beijing on December 
18th, 2019, the company has shown its deep interest in further develop iQiyi 
Knowledge App. To do so, it will diversify its knowledge delivery by partnering up 
with more than 1800 companies. This will allow for cross-industry collaboration to 
create and support short video technologies whose goal is to provide premium 
educational and interactive experiences to the company’s knowledge seekers. 
Furthermore, the company plans on investing 7,1 billion yuan as bonuses for 
content creators, to ensure that content provided is at its full potential (Graph 8). 
Performance 
In order to better grasp iQiyi’s financial performance regarding liquidity, leverage, 
efficiency and profitability. 
Liquidity 
In 2018, despite the overall improvement compared to the past two years, only 
the company’s current ratio (Current ratio = Current Assets/ Current Liabilities) 
was above one. Meaning that, iQiyi is a vulnerable company when it comes to 
meeting financial obligations, facing the risk of financial distress with its heavy 
reliance on intangible assets, fixed assets and inventories (the hardest assets to 





GRAPH 8. BIG DATA IMPORTANCE 
FOR SVOD COMPANIES 
 
Source: Company Website  
 
Current ratio Quick ratio Cash ratio Operating cash flow ratio
2016 43% 32% 8% -20%
2017 49% 25% 6% -95%
2018 1,00 0,67 0,23 -0,73
 
 










In spite of iQiyi’s efforts to raise assets’ value, liabilities more than offset gains. 
Both debt ratio (Debt Ratio = Total Liabilities/ Total Assets) and debt-to-equity 
ratio (Debt-to-Equity Ratio = Total Liabilities/ Shareholder's Equity) display the 





On the one hand, asset turnover (Asset Turnover Ratio = Net Sales/ Total 
Assets) is decreasing, meaning that the company requires more assets to 
produce the same revenue than before, a poor indicator of efficiency. On the 
other hand, its higher inventory (Inventory Turnover = COGS/ Average Inventory) 
and receivables turnover ratio (Receivables Turnover = Net Credit Sales/ 
Accounts Receivables) imply that inventory is sold more often, and receivables 
smoothly turned into cash. This, together with lower days in inventory (Days 
Sales in Inventory = 365/ Inventory Turnover), are favourable indicators of an 






iQiyi’s most daunting problem is its profitability, with three out of four profitability 
ratios below zero. Despite having a high gross margin (Gross Margin = Gross 
Profit/ Net Sales) of around 50% it is counteracted by the amortization of licensed 
copyrights, which account for almost half of revenues by itself, making the rest of 





Debt ratio Debt to equity ratio Interest coverage ratio Debt coverage ratio 
2016 87% 687% -21,88 -24,17
2017 59% 144% -12,75 -5,97
2018 0,60 1,47 -82,48 -0,92
TABLE 2. LEVERAGE RATIOS 
 







Days sales in 
inventory
2016 0,82 - 6,31 -
2017 0,86 2,41 7,77 151,76
2018 0,56 2,64 8,65 138,14
TABLE 3. EFFICIENCY RATIOS 
 





Return on asset ratio Return on equity 
ratio
2016 43% -22% -23% -177%
2017 50% -20% -18% -45%
2018 51% -31% -20% -50%
TABLE 4. PROFITABILITY RATIOS 
 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
 
 









Stock Performance – volatility analysis 
iQiyi shares became available for purchase for the general public after its IPO in 
the Nasdaq stock exchange on 28th of March of 2018 and have ever since been 
described as the most volatile stocks in the market. During this time, the 
company raised about $2.25 billion, pricing the 125 million shares available at 
$18. Since its debut, the share price has shown high volatility (Graph 9) with the 
period immediately after its debut on the public markets showing a price 
appreciation of 160% (reaching an all-time high of $40.16 a share in mid-June) 
followed by a 65% decline until the end of 2018.In 2019 the stock continued 
exhibiting an extremely high level of volatility, with various days where its value 
appreciated and depreciated over 10%. On the 22nd of February, the stock’s 
price climbed 22% to $27.7 after the company announced its 2018 results, 
beating analysts’ consensus estimates and with the issuance of a positive first 
quarter guidance. As of March, the stock had given up all of those gains going 
down to $22.87 a share, after the company anounced that it was raising $1.1 
billion in convertible bonds. After that, the price kept decreasing until the 20th of 
May to $18.34, in the midst of increased trade tensions (between China and the 
U.S.) and rumours that the company had cut 20% of its Shanghai staff (which 
were later denied by the company). On June 27, the stock price rose about 10% 
to $20.03 a share after it was announced that the company had won an 
innovation prize at the respected industry reunion Mobile World Congress. After 
this positive news, the stock kept its downward path until reaching a low level of 
$16.86 a share on the 7th of August. On September 11 the stock jumped almost 
13% to $19.32 with the announcement of a partnership with the Academy of 
Broadcasting Planning (despite the fact that this had already been announced so 
it was speculated that something else was behind this sudden move). After that, 
the stock price kept decreasing until the beginning of October, caused by the 
U.S. president threatening to delist Chinese companies from American stock 
exchanges, bringing fears to investors that an escalation in the trade war could 
hurt the value of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. In November, after the 
company, once again, announced better than expected results, the stock price 
rose 15% in a single day. The company announced a smaller than expected loss 
and resilient growth in its subscription business, giving confidence to investors 
that were already in a positive mood after news that China and the U.S. would 
roll back existing tariffs. Until the end of the year, and with no company specific 
news to cause any abrupt moves, the stock price kept increasing as trade 
tensions between the two countries kept decreasing (with a “Phase One Deal” 
being reached in mid-December). 
GRAPH 9. IQIYI STOCK PRICE 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 










iQiyi’s total shares outstanding sums up to 727,04 million, namely 316,13 million 
listed on NASDAQ and 410,91 million listed on BATS Global Markets. Regarding 
the top holders of the company stock (Table 5). In the first place is iQiyi’s parent 
company, the Chinese multinational technological company Baidu. Baidu is not 
only the largest holder of Class A shares (owning almost 18% of the company’s 
outstanding shares) as it also owns 100% of Class B shares (which represent 
92.9% of the voting rights). This gives the company almost absolute power over 
the decisions regarding iQiyi’s operations (as it holds over 94% of the voting 
rights), making it almost impossible for any equity holder to question the 
company’s control. The second largest holder of iQiyi’s stock is Hillhouse Capital 
Advisors, a private equity firm, owner of almost 16% of the company’s 
outstanding shares. Rounding out the top-3 largest owners of iQiyi stock is 
Schroders PLC, an asset management company holding about 4.4% of iQiyi’s 
outstanding stocks. The rest of the top-10 include some big players in the 
investment advising business, with companies such as Morgan Stanley, 
Blackrock, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse having considerable participation in 
iQiyi’s capital structure. All in all, the top-10 largest shareholders, own a little over 
50% of the total outstanding shares. While such a large presence of institutional 
investors, owners of significant expertise and considered savvy investment 
advisors, might be a sign that there is some confidence in the corporate world, 
might increase the pressure for the company to start producing results sooner 
than later, since these companies might not be afraid to sell their holdings if the 
return on the investment does not meet expectations. Additionally, such a large 
concentration of the float in a small number of companies is one of the reasons 
behind the extremely high volatility exhibited by the stock price as such 
companies, to adjust their positions, require a large amount of the float to be 
traded, sending clear signs to the overall market and causing the violent up and 







Rank Company Position Latest Change % of Outstanding Shares Institution Type
#1 Baidu Holdings Ltd 55.533.317 0 18% Holding Company
#2 Hillhouse Capital Advisors Ltd 50.516.188 36.006.170 16% Private Equity
#3 Schroders PLC 13.999.810 2.671.540 4% Investment Advisor
#4 Morgan Stanley 12.976.605 1.304.933 4% Investment Advisor
#5 BlackRock Inc 8.811.324 660.197 3% Investment Advisor
#6 Deutsche Bank AG 7.967.767 -196.702 3% Investment Advisor
#7 Bank of America Corp 7.784.393 -408.822 2% Bank
#8 Goldman Sachs Group Inc/The 5.832.375 -5.009 2% Investment Advisor
#9 Credit Suisse Group AG 5.537.427 2.514.828 2% Investment Advisor
#10 Matthews International Capital Man 5.493.400 692.700 174% Investment Advisor
TABLE 5. TOP 10 HOLDERS 
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The Online Video Industry 
Since Alphabet owned YouTube was banned from China in 2009, a number of 
companies have been disputing the top spot in terms of revenue, users and 
overall success in the online video market (Graph 10). According to Chinese 
consulting firm Entgroup 4 paid subscriptions have grown 119% over the last 
three years, a compound growth rate much larger than the one from overall 
Chinese internet users (which grew at just 6.28%). Accordingly, the number of 
paid subscriptions (Graph 11) is expected to reach 300 million this year, 
compared to 230 million in 2018 (an increase of over 30%). In 2019, revenue is 
expected to reach 125.8 billion yuan (a 100% increase since 2016) for the entire 
industry and is expected to reach 156.6 billion yuan in 2020.  
Competition 
Though several online video platforms are present in the country, there are only 
two with similarities in size and business model to be compared to iQiyi: 
Tencent Video 
Tencent Video is one of the top online video platforms in China. Launched in 
April 2011 and owned by the Chinese multinational conglomerate Tencent 
Holdings Limited, Tencent Video supports online Video on demand and television 
broadcasts, while providing features such as list management, video volume 
amplification, colour quality adjustment and other functional services. The 
platform provides a myriad of originally produced as well as third-party produced 
licensed content (from the likes of BBC Worldwide, ITV Studios, Fremantle 
Media, All3Media International, and Endemol UK, HBO as well as having the 
exclusive rights for the distribution of NBA games). Another important feature is 
the integration with Tencent owned platforms such as WeChat (largest mobile 
messaging app in the World), the older QQ messaging platform and Qzone social 
network. This integration made it possible to become the top Chinese video 
platform in terms of market share in 2018. As of the second quarter of 2019, the 
platform had 96.9 million subscribers, with revenues of US$26.4 billion (RMB177 
billion) for the whole 2018 5. 
 
                                                 
4 The Drum. (2020). Online video subscribers in China to pass 300 million in 2019. [online] Available at: https://www.thedrum.com/news/2019/02/12/online-
video-subscribers-china-pass-300-million-2019 [Accessed 16 Nov. 2019]. 
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Youku Tudou is a video hosting service and a subsidiary of the Chinese 
multinational conglomerate Alibaba Group. Founded in 2006, the company is 
often considered China’s Youtube, with more than 800 million videos per day and 
580 million monthly unique visitors. Youku Tudou was, however, only created 
after the merger between two of the biggest online video companies in the 
country, Youku and Tudou, in 2012. Nowadays the platform is a source of not 
only user created content but also exclusive self-produced and licensed content 
(for which it charges a subscription). The company has licensing deals with Sony 
Pictures and NBC Universal as well as the streaming rights for the FIFA World 
Cup, making it an attractive option for Chinese users. 
Performance 
While essentially supplying the same product, there is much separating the three 
platforms. As a publicly owned company, iQiyi faces greater scrutiny from 
investors regarding its financial performance, its operational statistics and its 
growth prospects. More than that, Baidu has been struggling to keep up in terms 
of performance within BAT (China’s tech giants, Baidu Group, Alibaba Group and 
Tencent Holdings Limited).  
In fact, Baidu’s stock price has decreased 55% from the highs reached in May of 
2018, evaluating the company in $44 billion. On the other hand, Alibaba stock is 
at an all-time high (with the company having a market cap of $580 billion). 
Furthermore, Tencent Holdings Limited, an extremely valuable company with a 
market cap of $465 billion, faced a 20% downturn from its January 2018 spike. 
This means that in terms of market cap, the companies behind iQiyi competitors 
are over 10 times larger than iQiyi parent company. While iQiyi has been able to 
remain the leader in the online video market (much related with the first-mover 
advantage) as user growth saturates and the “fight” for new content becomes 
fiercer, iQiyi might be unable to keep competing with its “deep-pocketed” rivals in 






TABLE 6. CHINA’S TECH GIANTS 
COMPETING PLATFORMS 
 





Baidu, Inc. $46,4B $133,8 $21,1
Tencent Holdings, Ltd. $468,4B $49,0 -
Alibaba Group Holding, Ltd. $582,2 $217,0 $47,0
















Comparing the strategic positioning (Graph 12) of each platform, regarding the 
pricing of VIP memberships, each company offers a different price depending on 
the amount of months subscribed. While this tactic is common to the three 
platforms, pricing points differ. The two market leaders (Tencent Video and iQiyi) 
charge 20 yuan and 19.8 yuan per month for its VIP subscription services ($2.87 
and $2.84 respectively) while Youku Tudou charges only 6 yuan ($0.86) – a sign 
of the relatively weaker content library available on this platform. The low prices 
charged are a consequence of the fierce price-war that these companies face.  
Without an urgent need to deliver profits, these have been offering its main 
product at a fraction of the cost it takes to produce them. There are three main 
drivers of this low pricing strategy. Firstly, the need to inflate subscription 
numbers and widen its user base. Secondly, for each parent company’s as a 
matter of fact, online video platforms aren’t the only product on their business 
model. As such, the companies might look at the loss made on the SVoD side of 
their business as the cost of attracting users to its online ecosystems. This cost 
will then be offset when the newly attracted customers use one of the other 
company’s platforms. Thirdly, each parent company operating framework. 
Membership services are only one of the revenue sources created by the online 
video platforms. By deploying this low-cost strategy, the companies hope to 
collect a series of followers for its content, increase its IP value and create 
leverage when negotiating the price of advertising placement in its platforms.  
It is important to mention that both iQiyi and Tencent Video are starting to 
capitulate on the low pricing strategy. Maybe forced by the increase in the 
content costs caused by the competitive environment felt in the industry, both 
players have started charging additional fees for “advance access” of premium 
content on top of the monthly VIP subscription charges. This shows that the 
mounting pressure to increase revenues and reduce losses associated with its 
operations. Additionally, iQiyi’s CEO announced on Reuters 6 that the price of its 
VIP subscription service is likely to increase 10% to 20% in the second half of 
2020. The executive justified this increase  with the stability felt in the industry, 
and the high costs caused by the competition, affirming: “The stability, which 
started second half of last year, is helpful in reducing the competitiveness of the 
market...We, the three players, think the cost is too high. We burnt too much 
money.”.  
                                                 
6 U.S. (2020). China video streamer iQiyi sees price hikes at home, gold abroad. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iqiyi/china-
video-streamer-iqiyi-sees-price-hikes-at-home-gold-abroad-idUSKBN1Y81NI [Accessed 5 Jan. 2020]. 
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Regarding the content strategy (Graph 13), companies moved away from its 
previous approach of betting in expensive (and prone to be censored) foreign 
content (with iQiyi boasting the top Korean content, Tencent being the home of 
HBO shows, British content and NBA games and with Youku failing to outbid any 
of his competitors in this expensive markets) and have started to invest heavily in 
original self-produced content aimed at domestic viewers.  
iQiyi remained committed to spending in content (Graph 14), this has helped the 
creation of new formats and allowed for the monetization of new subcultures by 
bringing them to the mainstream. Additionally, by investing heavily in technology 
(such as artificial intelligence, big data analytics and interactive content) a realm 
of user data is being collected which can be used in the future when making 
decisions related to content or when optimizing the reach of advertiser spots.  
While original content has been the focus of Youku Tudou for much of its 
existence (before being acquired by Alibaba in 2015, it lacked the financial 
firepower to compete with the other major platforms in the expensive sub-
licensing market), it has since been able to start competing in this field while 
producing some of the most well received original content (it had the best variety 
show and original drama of the summer). Moreover, Alibaba’s backing allows for 
integration with its e-commerce platforms Taobao and Tmall, multiplying the 
monetization possibilities for the platform and making it much easier to integrate 
advertisement (for instance, by allowing the user to directly purchase a product 
seen in a movie).  
Regarding Tencent, the company was known for its international content. From 
foreign-language movies and dramas, to Chinese remakes of popular 
international shows and live broadcast NBA games, the licensing of exclusive 
content was one of Tencent’s main focuses. In the last years, in order to keep 
pace with its competition, the company started paying more attention to original 
content, leveraging its ownership of major businesses across the entertainment 
sector (in music, gaming, literature and film) to use intellectual property to create 
content. Additionally, the company owns the beloved social media platform 
WeChat, making it possible to integrate these businesses and user bases (just 
like Youku Tudou and Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms). 
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Through this analysis it is possible to understand that iQiyi position as market 
leader might be at risk. Despite enjoying first-mover advantage, with the entrance 
of other players backed by some of the largest companies in China (and even the 
World) iQiyi ability to continue growing its user base in an exponential way may 
be limited in the future. The competition for premium content will remain 
extremely pronounced, and the existence of numerous other smaller online video 
streaming platforms may also play a part in the company’s ability to keep 
growing. 
Additionally, there is an existential threat affecting the online video streaming 
market: short video mobile apps. According to a study performed by 
Marketingimpott & Microsoft Corp 7, since 2012, when the Industrial Revolution 
4.0 started, human attention span shrank from 12 seconds to 8 seconds in 2018, 
a second less than a gold fish’s attention span. Indeed, only 55% of internet 
users, spend more than 15 active seconds on a platform. This has made content 
producers fight for the remaining awareness of the younger generations, an 
important rival to the traditional long video format has emerged, namely the short 
video apps that distribute content with a much lower duration at a fraction of the 
cost (since it is often a consumer-produced content).  
Living in a World with the ever-constant presence of several different screens at 
all times, these apps have gained popularity with younger users for its easy 
accessibility, social media integration and cost structure (free of charge). 
Bytedance is the company behind the most popular app of this type, Douyin, (and 
its international version, TikTok), which has emerged as the World’s most 
valuable startup (with a valuation of $75 billion, surpassing the value of Baidu: 
iQiyi parent company 8). This shows the ability of this format to attract new users, 






                                                 
7 The Independent. (2020). Our attention span is now less than that of a goldfish. [online] Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/our-
attention-span-is-now-less-than-that-of-a-goldfish-microsoft-study-finds-10247553.html [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020]. 
8 Meet all of the world's startups valued at $1B+ in our ongoing list of all unicorn companies in the U.S. and abroad. (2020). The Complete List of Unicorn 
Countries. [online] Available at: https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [Accessed 5 Jan. 2020]. 
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[To ensure consistency and reliability, all data was assembled from Bloomberg 
database as of 3rd of January 2020] 
The multiples valuation method enables an accurate past performance analysis 
of the company, compared to its industry. Accordingly, this method was used to 
get a first overview of the value of the company. To disregard the consideration 
of only past values, blended forward multiples were used.  
Despite its fast and easy implementation, the multiples valuation can display 
different results as there are different frameworks and techniques on how to 
perform them. For this valuation, we considered six of the main peer companies 
of iQiyi: Bilibili, Tencent Videos, Netflix, Huya, Momo and YY. The choice of the 
multiples was based on the relevance of such values for potential investment and 
the fact that certain multiples are not indicative of financial performance due to 
iQiyi’s negative income. Price over sales allows for a comparison with market 
share price. Indeed, the price given of 0,27$ is much below the current valuation 
of around 22$, meaning that, at a first glance the company does indeed seem to 
be overvalued. Also, enterprise value over sales estimate an enterprise value of 
25 million dollars compared to iqiyi’s current market cap of 16B dollars. Once 
more, this value is just a first insight about the company valuation that will be 
calculated with, more robust and adequate methods in the following section, 











EV/S (Current) EV/S (12M Forward) P/S (Current) P/S (12M Forward)
BILI US 7,4 5,0 7,6 5,17
YY US 0,7 0,6 1,3 1,0
HUYA US 2,4 1,8 3,5 2,6
MOMO US 2,6 2,3 3,1 2,7
TME US 4,9 3,8 5,7 4,4
NFLX US 7,6 6,2 7,1 5,9
Average 4,3 3,3 4,7 3,6
IQIYI INC  $                  25.009.500,74  $                            23.475.739,67  $                            0,27  $                                           0,25 
TABLE 8. IQIYI’S MULTIPLES VALUATION 
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In order to estimate the attractiveness of iQiyi as an investment opportunity, the 
discounted cash flow method was used, as a mean to compute the final value of 
the company. For the purpose of better structure, the valuation will be segmented 
between: Main drivers, and WACC assumptions, followed by the final 
recommendation to investors. 
Main Drivers 
Revenues 
To have a deeper understanding of each revenue stream, we divided iQiyi’s 
revenues into four sources of income: 1) Membership services, 2) Online 
advertising services, 3) Content distribution and 4) Others. 
1) Membership Services 
Since 2018, revenue from membership services has been iQiyi’s number one 
source of revenue stream (Graph 15). After performing a historical analysis, one 
can conclude that this figure displayed sizeable growth in 2016 (277% compared 
to 2015), a positive trend that persists throughout the following periods 
(compound rate of 33,4%, per annum, from 2016 until 2031). Membership 
revenues have two main drivers: number of subscriptions and average revenue 
per subscription. As for the number of subscriptions, subscription growth among 
the industry has been slowing down considerably (from an annual growth of 28% 
in 2016 to 4% in 2019 – iiMedia Research 9) as the market subscriber’s base 
matures and China’s macroeconomic conditions weaken (namely, slower 
population growth and % of 15-64 year olds, which comprise SVoD’s target 
consumer base – World Data Bank10). However, iQiyi has both a competitive 
advantage and an opportunity to grow which might allow it to contradict this 
trend. Firstly, depending on the chosen subscription option, the company charges 
monthly fees that range from RMB6 to RMB19, which are below the amount 
charged by other premium content providers. This low price strategy, aligned with 
the company’s heavy investment on technology and content, allows the company 
to set the ground for a loyal customer base, which represents a clear competitive 
advantage in terms of positive membership growth. Secondly, the yet to explore 
streaming market in lower tier cities and upward demographic levels of  
                                                 
9
 Statista. (2020). China: online streaming user number 2020 | Statista. [online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1061708/china-online-
streaming-user-number/ [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020]. 
10
 Data.worldbank.org. (2020). Population ages 15-64 (% of total population) - China | Data. [online] Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS?locations=CN [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020]. 
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population, as well as the future expansion to different geographies with 
considerable Chinese diasporas, will allow iQiyi’s continued growth. With this 
said, it is expected an average increase of 6 million members per year, reaching 
a total of 163 million subscribers by 2029 (Graph 16). To compute subscription’s 
numbers, we used the country’s population, number of internet users11 (as of 
2019 around 60% of population – World Data Bank) and number of online video 
users (around 74% of internet users) to estimate SVoD’s penetration rate. Based 
on the market trends presented above, for the forecasting period, we assumed 
that the number of internet users increased at a rate of 50 million people per year 
(with the penetration rate reaching 100% in 2031), while the number of online 
video users grew at a rate of around 35 million people per year (with the 
penetration rate remaining more or less stable until the end of the forecasting 
period). Regarding average revenue per subscription, it is expected to stabilize 
within 7 years. As explained above, iQiyi’s client base is predicted to expand, 
allowing for an organic growth of revenues which ultimately offsets the need for 
promotions in the form of discounts over the full subscription price (mentioned on 
Q3 2019 Conference Call 12). Consequently, fluctuations in the subscription fee 
will be less common and pricing will become more homogenous amongst clients. 
This said, it is expected that from 2027 onwards average revenue per 
subscription will keep constant at a monthly subscription fee of ¥0,53. 
2) Online Advertising Services 
In order to forecast the online advertising segment, we calculated the average 
revenue per brand advertiser, according to the number of brand advertisers 
currently working with IQYI. Our analysis showed that the growth rate of this 
stream of revenue was, for the first time since 2015, negative during 2019. This 
might reflect the difficult macroeconomic conditions affecting the country, the 
delay of certain content launches (caused by increased regulatory scrutiny (i.e. 
censorship) and the unexpectedly slow return of in-feed advertising. Considering 
that these conditions are likely to persist until the end of the year, the group 
chose to assume that the growth rates of -16% for both the number of advertisers 
as well as average revenue per advertiser would be maintained for the rest of the 
year. Although the issues affecting this segment were to a large extent related 
with fitful situations specific to iQiyi (instead of an overall shift in the online 
advertising industry), from 2019 onwards, growth rates forecasted by Statista for 
the online advertising spending in China were used (Graph 18), as these see eye  
                                                 
11 Data.worldbank.org. (2020). Individuals using the Internet (% of population) - China | Data. [online] Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=CN [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020]. 
12 iQiyi Investor Relations Website. 
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to eye with our belief that this segment is due for a rebound after a challenging 
2019, particularly if considering that the demise of old media vehicles will make 
advertising departments funnel more funds to advertising in online platforms such 
as iQiyi. In what regards the number of brand advertisers, a linear forecast based 
on historical data is taken as a reasonable approach, since economic growth in 
China is expected to be robust for the considerable future and, as such, the 
number of brands with the means and desire to use iQiyi as an advertisement 
platform are expected to grow accordingly. 
3) Content Distribution 
Regarding content distribution, it is essential to get a grasp of how many shows 
iQiyi licenses on a yearly basis. iQiyi’s content and marketing strategy for 2020 
continues to settle upon the creation of new content liked by the general public. 
Nonetheless, from this year onwards, the company also aims to produce vertical 
content that caters to the demands of the addressed audiences. The extra effort 
put into this segment in the form of investments (including a 2.86 billion 
investment for new content production in 2019), will broaden the company’s 
original library (Graph 20). Furthermore, iQiyi is focused on enhancing viewer’s 
experience by incorporating innovative technology into content creation. Through 
the use of AI to refine content creation and recommendation algorithms, it will be 
possible to meet increasingly customized audience needs. Considering the 
above, an increase of the average licensing price is expected (Graph 21), due to 
the ever more important value-added of new content. 
4) Others  
Since the acquisition of Skymoons on July 2018, an online game developer, this 
segment has become more relevant than ever before. This addition means that 
most of the revenue in this segment (around 3 billion RMB in 2018) comes from 
the monetization of the videogames developed by this company. However, no 
public information regarding the operations of this segment are publicly available 
(such as number of games, time spent playing online etc.) and, as such, the 
group chose to perform a linear regression forecast, in accordance with past 
data.  
Operating Expenses 
iQiyi’s operational costs consist primarily of five captions: Cost of revenues, 
selling, general and administrative expenses, research and development 
expenses, depreciations and amortizations and income taxes. 
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1) Cost of revenues 
The company disaggregates the costs of revenues into: 1) Content cost (which 
consist of costs related with original content, licensed copyrights, revenue 
sharing costs for content uploaded by partners, expenses for original content and 
costs incurred for live broadcasting hosts), 2) Bandwidth costs (fees payed to 
telecommunications carriers and other service providers for telecommunications 
and other content delivery-related services) and 3) Others (whose composition is 
not disclosed by the company). 
Content costs went up 56% to reach 6.7 billion yuan in 2018. As a matter of fact, 
as iQiyi produces more in-demand shows, production expenses arise. On the 
other hand, iQiyi’s unique content library together with the fortuitous 
circumstances surrounding the company have brought several perks in terms of 
content costs. Firstly, paid royalties for copyrights of the company’s content have 
translated into a 2 billion yuan gain to the company, 81% more than in the 
previous year, meaning that iQiyi has been able to monetize its investments. 
Also, TV production slowdown, which began on the second half of 2018, left most 
SVoD companies on a favourable position when it comes to bargaining power. 
Lastly, the reduction on talent costs due to a 40% cap on actors’ salaries, arising 
from recent regulations, have made iQiyi’s CFO comfortable to state that the 
company will keep within the path it set out to follow.  All things considered, it is 
expected that content costs continue to increase, however at a slower pace until 
2030 (Graph 23) a time at which they are predicted to reach a steady state. 
Regarding bandwidth costs, as a video streaming services’ provider, iQiyi bases 
its platform operations on cloud infrastructure. This implies increasing transfers in 
and out of this infrastructure as the consumer base widens and demand 
increases. Since subscribers are expected to grow yearlong, the company will 
incur in further costs (Graph 24), maturing from 3 billion yuan in 2019 to 11 billion 
in 2031. 
For the segment “Others”, considering that no information was given regarding 
what the company classifies as these types of costs, the group decided to use 
the other two foregoing components described above as drivers of these costs’ 
growth, along with a ratio estimated using historical data. Since this ratio turned 
out to be quite steady throughout the years past (varying less than one percent 
between 2016 and 2018), we fixed this value at -33.2% for the forecasting period.  
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2) Selling General and Administrative Expenses 
SG&A expenses are comprised by two main drivers: personnel headcount and 
unitary compensation. iQiyi will be expected to reach its productivity steady state, 
and consequently, its target headcount, in 2030, as mentioned before. 
Concerning average compensation, it was taken as input the increasing 
personnel compensation trend since 2011, the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution 4.0 (data available on the National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
3) Research & Development Expenses 
Research & development has been the pillar for most technological companies’ 
competitive advantage, and iQiyi is not an exception. Indeed, according to The 
China Briefing (“China Labour Market: Hiring Costs, Job Preferences, Talent 
Acquisition”), most technology related companies have been investing on the 
recruitment of engineers as well as on strategic partnerships with other 
corporations to strengthen the core of its R&D talent and, as stated by the 
Founder and CEO of iQiyi, to boost the market potential of this industry, “We 
believe 5G will create enormous growth potential and emerge as a catalyst for 
the entertainment industry”. In truth, iQiyi has established three major strategic 
partnerships with China Unicom, China Telecom and China Mobile (three 
dominant players in the Chinese telecommunications industry), to develop an 
innovation lab where technology testing takes place in the hope to aid the 
company’s promise to deliver premium content. For the forecast of R&D 
expenses and headcount, were used as support these trends together with 
historical data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China regarding 
investments made by technological companies on research expenses (“Basic 
Statistics on R&D Activities of Large and Medium Sized Enterprises by industrial 
sector”). 
4) Depreciations and Amortizations 
Depreciation and Amortizations are highly material to iQiyi. As for fixed assets it 
was considered the depreciation map (Graph 27) together with the fact that the 
company’s accounting policies consider all assets to depreciate according to the 
straight-line method. Furthermore, for amortization of intangible assets, licensed 
copyrights and produced content, it’s paramount to account for these assets 
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Computer equipment 3                   5                                                     
Office furniture and equipment 3                   5                                                     
Leasehold improvements*
Office building 43                 
Others 5                   
 Over the shorter of lease terms or 
estimated useful lives of the assets 
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5) Income Taxes 
Income taxes were adjusted to sparse captions, namely “Deemed Income” and 
“Other adjustments”, as well as to PRC preferential tax rates and tax holiday 
benefits due to expire in the foreseeable future (2020 to 2021). Substantial tax 
captions where forecasted based on PRC taxation laws as well as on Deloitte’s 
International Tax Report (China Highlights 2019). 
Net working capital 
There are two main trends guiding iQiyi’s value of net working capital: content 
production and licensing agreements. 
As seen before, iQiyi has strong prospects when it comes to content production. 
Nonetheless, it has also decided to invest on acquiring licensed copyrights to 
further diversify its content library portfolio. In late 2017, rumours started to 
spread out regarding Netflix’s so expected presence in the Chinese market. 
However, it turned out that the penetration strategy for this worldwide giant 
included iQiyi.  
The Chinese company has recently raised its allocated budget to invest on 
Netflix’s content supply. This along with the announced in-house production of 
new content, explains the exponential growth expected for iQiyi’s net working 
capital (Graph 28) from 13 billion yuan in 2019 to 87 billion yuan in 2030. 
Net working capital as a measure of short-term liquidity, is deeply connected to 
costs of revenues and revenues itself. To forecast values of operating cash and 
cash equivalents, accounts payables, accounts receivables, prepayments, and 
most other components of net working capital, ratios in relation to the former 
captions were used taking as starting point the reported values of the company. 
As for amounts due to/from related parties, we have adopted proportions of 
advertising and accrued expenses, as these are the preeminent drivers of the 
depicted value. 
ROIC, RONIC, g 
During the period under analysis (2016-2018), iQiyi Return on Invested Capital 
(ROIC) varied greatly. Starting with a value of -1141% in 2016, it is clear that the 
company was not having success in creating value to its investors. In fact, 
observing the company’s income statement we see that it has failed to post a 
profit during a single quarter since its existence, so it is obvious that when 
calculating the ROIC this value will always be negative. In 2017 the company’s 
ROIC improved dramatically to -46% thanks to a slight increase in the ratio Gross 
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Margin over Revenues and to a very pronounced increase in the ratio Net 
Working Capital over Revenues (which changed from -35.5% to 16%). In 2018 
the value for ROIC decreased again to -54% on the back of a decrease in the 
ratio Depreciation over Revenues. 
Regarding Return on New Invested Capital (RONIC), this ratio was equal to 
915% in 2017, mirroring iQiyi’s increasing performance compared to the previous 
year. In 2018 the company had a RONIC equal to -64%, showing (once again) its 
inability to use new capital in a productive way for investors. 
Starting in 2016, iQiyi had a 300% increase in Free Cash Flow (FCF). However, 
for this year and the next (81% change) this is not a positive sign since it meant 
an increase in losses. For the next two years, the negative growth rates (-58% 
and -485%) had the opposite meaning: a decrease in the losses and the first ever 
profit in the company’s history. For the next two years the growth rate remained 
very high at 182% and 90%, before going down to a more reasonable level of 
54% in 2023. From that point onward, the growth rate kept decreasing in a less 
constant way until it reached the level of 10% in 2031. 
WACC Assumptions 
To calculate cost of capital, the first step was to calculate iQiyi’s equity beta. After 
performing this step for iQiyi and its group of comparables a levered industry beta 
of 1.53 was reached. Afterwards, the debt beta was computed for the same 
group of companies. To do so, each firm’s Altman’s Z’’ score was collected (a 
measure of a company’s financial state calculated using several financial ratios 
relevant to predict the company’s probability of default). Then, using a matching 
table created by Altman and Hotchkiss 13 we made the connection between a 
company’s Z’’ score and its credit rating. With this and a different 
correspondence table (created by Duff and Phelps) we calculated each 
company’s debt beta. iQiyi was the company with the worst credit rating (D) 
corresponding to the highest debt beta (0.865) within the average for the group of 
comparables of 0.4745 and with a median of 0.805. After reaching the values for 
the debt betas we unlevered each company’s equity beta and calculated the 
median of these values, reaching an unlevered industry beta equal to 1.70. By re-
levering this value, using iQiyi target capital structure, we arrive at the final value 
for the company’s equity beta equal to 1.84. The decision to maintain iQiyi’s 
target capital structure equal to the current one follows many reasons. Firstly, 
considering iQiyi relatively high debt to equity ratio of 47%, and considering the 
fact that the company has yet to deliver a profit for a single quarter in its  
                                                 













existence, we believe that it might be hard for the company to raise additional 
debt at a cost that would be advantageous for itself. With this said, we believe 
that the Debt level is going to remain relatively stable in the near future. 
Secondly, considering the high volatility that the stock price has exhibited since 
its IPO back in 2018, an equity raise might be interpreted by investors as a tell-
tale that the company's equity is significantly overvalued, which could trigger a 
sell-off of the company's stock. Finally, the uncertainty about future growth 
prospects (caused by trade tensions around the World, as well as the possibility 
of a looming recession affecting the World economy in general, and China in 
particularly) might cause the company to be wary of any sudden capital structure 
changes, possibly trying to keep some flexibility in case economic conditions turn 
out to be worse than expected. To calculate the risk-free rate, we added an 
inflation differential (the difference between the yield of the 10-Year Chinese 
Government bond in yuan and US Dollars - equal to 1.17%) to the 10-Year US 
Government Bond Yield (equal to 1.54%) to reach a risk-free rate equal to 
2.71%. The group decided to use a market risk premium of 5% 14, as common 
practice in the industry. To calculate the cost of debt we used two different 
methods. First, we used iQiyi previously calculated synthetic rating (D) to get a 
credit spread equal to 19.38% to be added to the risk-free rate, reaching a cost of 
debt equal to 22.09%. As a second approach, the group subtracted from the 
publicly traded bond’s yield to maturity (6.5%) the product between the probability 
of default (equal to 0.10% - as estimated by Bloomberg) and the value of Loss 
Given Default (equal to 61.9% - using once again the synthetic rating and the 
average recovery rates as calculated by Moody’s), reaching a cost of debt equal 
to 6.44%. The two methods used to calculate the return on iQiyi debt yield very 
different results that are considerably hard to explain. However, we believe the 
difference might be caused by the approach used in each method to reach the 
result. While the first method uses a fundamental approach, by calculating a 
synthetic rating, through the company's Altman Z'' score (which in its turn uses a 
number of different financial ratios that would be, in theory, telling of the 
company's credit worthiness), that is then used to compute a credit spread to add 
to the risk-free rate, the second method uses market based information (such as 
the yield to maturity of the company's debt, the probability of default, as 
calculated by Bloomberg, and the CDS spread) which depends not only on 
fundamental information about the company, but also on different supply and 
                                                 
14 Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy: Predict and Avoid Bankruptcy, Analyze and Invest in Distressed Debt; 
Edith Hotchkiss and Edward Altman; Figure 12.1 
 
 








demand mechanics that influence the price of financial assets. Additionally, and 
considering the fact that both the Federal Reserve as well as the PBOC have  
been employing measures to flood the markets with liquidity (through 
Quantitative Easing, low interest rates, between others), the prices of financial 
assets might be considerably distorted and might not be a true representation of 
company's fundamental values. As such the group decided to find a middle 
ground by calculating the average of the rd calculated by each method and use it 
as the pre-tax cost of debt for the company reaching a cost of debt equal to 
10.70%. Finally, using iQiyi’s target capital structure of 15% D/EV and 85% E/EV, 






Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis 
To perform the sensitivity analysis, we started by verifying how the forecast for 
the stock price would change if our assumptions regarding the cost of capital 
(WACC) and the growth rate in perpetuity (g) were different. We set the growth 
rate as well as the cost of capital in a 90% confidence interval. By observing the 
table with the results of the different combinations we see how dependent the 
stock price is on these two assumptions. In fact, the stock price exhibits a high 
level of variation with small changes in these two values, going from a high level 
of $27,06 with g equal to 8,3% and WACC equal to 11,4% to a low level of $9,5 
with g equal to 6,8% and WACC equal to 11,4%. Anyhow, the values provided in 
the sensitivity analysis, with a 90% confidence interval, allow us to corroborate 
the forecasted results. As a matter of fact, even at the most optimistic scenario, 
the target price of iQiyi’s shares is below the market value, meaning that the 






D E EV D/EV E/EV D/E Equity Beta Debt Beta Unlevered Beta Industry Betas (w/o outliers)
iQiyi 6052,3 36609,2 42661,5 0,1 0,9 0,2 2,0 0,9 1,9 1,9
People.cn -2447,3 22614,5 20167,2 -0,1 1,1 -0,1 2,2 -0,1 2,5 2,5
360 Security Technology -16903,5 158830,8 141927,3 -0,1 1,1 -0,1 1,0 -0,3 1,2 1,2
SINA -898,8 3965,2 3066,3 -0,3 1,3 -0,2 1,5 0,0 2,0 2,0
Hunan TV & Broadcast Intermediary 5825,6 9431,0 15256,6 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,7 -
Bilibili -1779,8 33453,7 31673,9 -0,1 1,1 -0,1 1,6 0,3 1,7 1,7
Sohu -1427,9 1236,3 -191,5 7,5 -6,5 -1,2 1,7 0,8 -4,7 -
Roku -228,8 11950,5 11721,7 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,5 0,8 1,5 1,5
Netflix 9104,3 117284,8 126389,2 0,1 0,9 0,1 1,5 0,8 1,4 1,4
Median -898,8 22614,5 20167,2 0,0 1,0 -0,1 1,5 0,8 1,5 1,7
Average -360,3 41799,0 41283,9 0,7 0,3 -0,1 1,5 0,5 0,9 1,7
GRAPH 29. WACC MAIN VALUES 
 
Source : Bloomberg 
GRAPH 30. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
19,32$ 10,6% 11,1% 11,7% 12,3% 12,9%
8,3% 38,99$    29,95$    23,64$      19,22$ 15,82$ 
7,9% 33,30$    26,32$    21,21$      17,50$ 14,58$ 
7,6% 29,23$    23,59$    19,32$      16,13$ 13,57$ 
7,2% 26,05$    21,38$    17,74$      14,96$ 12,69$ 
















All procedures done, iQiyi, Inc. was valued with an equity value of $10.8B taking 
the DCF approach into account. Considering the number of shares outstanding, 
iQiyi’s price per share is $14,81. Looking at the initial multiples’ valuation, the 
price per share would be around $0,27, which is slightly lower than the one given 
by DCF, meaning that, despite bringing only a first idea of the real value of the 
company, as mentioned above, this value, somewhat, reflects the performed 
valuation for iQiyi, Inc. According to financial data, iQiyi’s shares were trading at 
$23,20 on the 6th of January 2020, which is higher than the one brought to 
conclusion in this equity research. This said, the team advises investors to short 
sell iQiyi’s shares since their price will decrease in the future. According to more 
recent data, it was possible to verify that this decrease turned out to be real. 
iQiyi’s shares fell in price for the past year, a tendency that has been slowly 
reverted to a better scenario as of today. Hence, the real path of the iQiyi’s 
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